Grants in Russian
Taxation of grants, or support of science in RussianBalatsky Evgeny Vsevolodovich, The Capital of the Country magazine
1. The problem of "dilution" of grants.
Currently, the current grant system in Russia has many serious drawbacks. Among them, a special place is occupied by the system of taxation of subventions allocated by state funds for research. The essence of this system consists in spending money allocated by state funds (the Russian State Humanitarian Fund (RGNF), the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), etc.) to individual researchers and research teams through legal entities. The legislator not only does not provide, but also openly prohibits direct transfers of money to individuals engaged in scientific research. Thus, although individuals participate in the competition for grants, who ultimately win subventions for research projects, these amounts pass through organizations that have nothing to do with these projects.
The immediate result of such a system is that subventions for research grants fall into a kind of "tax meat grinder" of legal entities, which cuts off a significant part of the initial amount. As a result, direct researchers who carry out projects receive amounts far from those that appear in the financial statements of state funds. Thus, the funds allocated for research are being eroded. The amount that appears as the price of the research grant does not reach the final recipient at all.
The current system of taxation of grants leads to the fact that individual researchers are constantly "stuck" by economic structures that suck off a significant part of the funds allocated by the state. Meanwhile, the state itself uses legal entities as a channel through which part of the funds allocated for research is withdrawn back to the budget through the launch of an appropriate tax mechanism. Thus, a situation arises when the state provides funds for scientific research with one hand, and selects them with the other hand. This system cannot be considered normal in any way, since almost all Western funds operate on completely different principles: money is allocated to the direct executors of the grant (individuals) and they are not subject to taxation. Russia has built its own grant model of science, different from the progressive Western models.
From what has been said, it is clear that from the point of view of stimulating research activities, the effectiveness of the Russian model of funding research grants is much lower than the effectiveness of the Western model. However, the severity of this problem directly depends on the magnitude of the financial losses incurred by researchers as a result of the "rental" of grant funds through organizations and enterprises. If these losses are small, then the problem itself is not too relevant, if the losses are significant, then the very expediency of the current grant financing system is in question.
2. Assessment of the scale of losses of research subventions due to taxation of legal entities.
Let's take a closer look at the leakage of funds that researchers have as a result of the current taxation system. To do this, it is necessary to take into account several points.
Firstly, the organization through which the grant is financed is entitled to a kind of "award". Its size is strictly limited: for RGNF it is no more than 15% of the total grant amount, for RFBR – no more than 20%. From a financial point of view, this award is due to the need for the organization to carry out the costs of organizational, financial and technical support of the research project. However, in any case, this is a direct deduction from the grant recipient's income.
Secondly, as soon as the money arrives at the account of a legal entity and takes the form of a salary, such a tax norm as payroll accruals immediately comes into force in respect of them. This is another serious deduction from the grant recipient's income. This deduction occurs automatically when an individual (researcher) is transferred to a legal entity (organization). Accordingly, such a transfer has a detrimental effect on the researcher's work motivation.
Thirdly, the accrued salary of the researcher is automatically subject to income tax. This form of withdrawal is also beyond the control of the researcher and acts automatically.
In order to assess the scale of financial losses of researchers when "rolling" grants through legal entities, we formalize the current system of taxation of subventions allocated for research grants.
If S is used to indicate the initial amount of the research grant ("dirty" income), and D is the amount of money received by the researcher on hand ("clean" income), then the relationship between them, taking into account the current tax system, can be expressed as follows (1):
, where v is the share of overhead costs associated with the "registration" of the grant (the cost of registering research work in VNTIC, the commission to the bank for transferring wages to plastic cards, etc.); α is the standard of accruals for labor (unified social tax); β is the share of grant funds going to organizational-financial and technical support of the project; y – income tax rate.
It is easy to see from formula (1) that the relationship between the "dirty" and "clean" incomes of the grant recipient is expressed by the trivial formula (2), where k is the proportionality coefficient that plays the role of the efficiency of grant subventions and is estimated by formula (3):
The coefficient k is directly related to the loss coefficient, which plays the role of the dissipation coefficient (scattering) of grant subventions. This coefficient (r) will also be interpreted in the future as a tax burden, which fully corresponds to its deep meaning, because the dissipation of financial resources is mainly due to the action of fiscal instruments.
The obtained ratios reproduce the current accounting system of taxation of grant funds and allow for simple valuation calculations. To do this, we will use the following values of the parameters appearing in formulas (1)-(3). The share of overhead costs includes the costs of registering research work in VNTIC, a commission to the bank for transferring wages to plastic cards and deductions for increasing the value of the organization's inventory. As a rule, this value is insignificant and for grants of average size is v = 3-4%. The standard of accruals for labor remuneration α (unified social tax) currently amounts to α = 26.2% of the amount of wages. The share of the β grant funds going to the organizational, financial and technical support of the project for the RGNF is β = 15%. Although in regulatory documents the figure of 15% is stipulated as the limit (formally it can be zero), in practice it is used when working with grant subventions. The income tax rate γ at the moment is γ =13%.
Given the given parameter values, it is not difficult to assess the effectiveness of research grants in Russia. To do this, take a specific value v = 3.2% and use the formula (3):
Thus, the efficiency of grant subventions is k=56.7%. Accordingly, the coefficient of dissipation of grant subventions is r = 43.3%. If we consider the RFBR, for which β = 20%, then these figures will amount to 53.4% and 46.6%, respectively.
Thus, today's Russian tax system is set up in such a way that about half of the grants issued are returned to the state treasury. This amount of tax burden is considered unacceptably high even for legal entities conducting commercial activities. Similarly, this value is immensely overestimated for individuals. Thus, the tax burden of grant subsidies does not meet any international and Russian standards. If we take into account that the grants themselves represent a specific form of charity (in our case, state charity), then such a taxation system seems completely absurd.
3. Transfer of individuals to legal entities: economic and legal conflicts.
To date, the federal law "On Amendments to Article 217 of Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation" No. 38-FZ dated March 23, 2007 has already been adopted, according to which the Tax Code of the Russian Federation (NCRF) has been amended regarding the taxation of grants. In accordance with the new version of the NCRF, the income of individuals received by taxpayers in the form of grants (gratuitous assistance) provided to support science and education, culture and art in the Russian Federation by international, foreign and (or) Russian organizations according to the lists of such organizations approved by the Government of the Russian Federation is not subject to taxation. The new tax rule should come into force on January 1, 2008.
The main difference of the new system is the introduction of tax benefits not only for international and foreign, but also for Russian organizations that issue research grants. This step is absolutely justified and long overdue. However, it should be noted that by introducing a tax benefit for individuals, Russian legislation does not provide for the main thing – the refusal of the procedure for transferring individuals to legal entities. Meanwhile, this mechanism is the main crisis link of the Russian grant system. Let's look at this question in more detail.
Firstly, the personal income tax benefit does not cover the tax burden associated with the transition of researchers under the patronage of legal entities. So, according to our calculations, the elimination of income tax on grant subventions under current conditions will lead to the fact that the efficiency coefficient k will increase from 56.7% to 65.2%. Thus, the total tax burden for researchers will be reduced by 8.5 percentage points (pp). Meanwhile, removing researchers from the "cage" of legal entities and returning them to the original status of individuals, even while maintaining income tax, would increase the efficiency coefficient k from 56.7% to 87.0%. In this case, the researchers' tax gain would be 30.3 percentage points, which is 3.6 times more than the gain from saving on income tax. Thus, the Russian state once again goes to the cosmetic repair of the tax system, preserving its essential shortcomings.
Secondly, by "driving" Russian researchers into the framework of legal entities, the Russian state thereby carries out a number of actions that are incorrect from an economic and legal point of view. Thus, acting as a benefactor when issuing a grant, the state finds a legal entity that not only becomes a channel for moving money from the state to the researcher, but also an employer for the researcher. And as an employer, this legal entity is obliged to make all stipulated tax payments. Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that the specified organization cannot act as an employer under the grant, and the researcher cannot act as an employee. This is a fundamental economic and legal mistake. Note in passing that the state itself does not act as an employer in relation to the researcher. It does not give him a job, but buys the product of his work, paying a mutually agreed price. This is the deep meaning of the competitive grant system. Given that the grant received by the researcher represents his income, the maximum that the state can claim is income tax. In many cases, grant subsidies receive the status of charitable donations, which eliminates this tax payment.
Thirdly, the grant system as such, focused on supporting free researchers, is in clear contradiction with the current grant system, focused on researchers who are rigidly "tied" to a specific organization. The deep meaning of the competitive grant system is to eliminate legal entities from the competition process. Moreover, this system assumes that some researchers may even lose their permanent jobs at some point in time, but continue working on the grant and participate in new competitions. With the current system of linking individual researchers to organizations, a kind of analogue of the serf system of dependence of researchers on their financial channel in the person of the organization through which their projects are financed arises. Today in Russia, an unemployed researcher who could not agree with any organization on the financial "pumping" of his grant is automatically deprived of the right to the grant itself.
Fourth, the grant system is ideally focused on purely individual researchers and their small teams on specific projects, while the Russian system provokes work with a mass researcher. This contradiction is a direct consequence of the inclusion of legal entities in the grant system. For example, a large institute or university whose employees have won a grant draws up all the documentation in such a way that it reflects the financial picture for all project participants at once. Sometimes, for some reason, the loss of one participant from the general list automatically disrupts the paperwork of all other participants. Thus, there is a contradiction between the individual nature of research grants and the mass (conveyor) nature of the financial accounting system of legal entities.
The considered aspects of the taxation of grant subventions show that at the moment we have a completely distorted, ugly system of relations between various economic entities: the state, the researcher (individual) and the organization (legal entity). Nevertheless, such a system of relations is beneficial to the Russian state, as it allows it to save or, rather, return budget money.
4. The role of the state's trust in the population and the contours of the new system.
The principles of the work of Russian state funds financing scientific research, which have been fixed for several years, are irrational. The involvement of legal entities in the process of financing individual grants does not justify itself. What is the reason for this state of affairs?
In our opinion, this is due to the lack of trust of the state in its citizens. In his opinion, it is possible to conclude a contract with an individual only if there is a guarantee from a legal entity. An individual researcher, as a rule, does not have a bank account, does not have an office, does not keep financial statements, and in general, by definition, he is unreliable. The state constantly suspects researchers of wanting to embezzle money without working it out. Nothing else can justify the fact that the state refuses to deal directly with researchers. In contrast to state funds, Western funds base their activities on the principles of funding researchers directly. Moreover, many of them categorically refuse to deal with any legal entities. On the contrary, many Western foundations encourage family grants when spouses, parents and children conduct joint research in the chosen direction. And Western foundations are not afraid that the notorious families of researchers will not fulfill their obligations!
A similar case of distrust on the part of the Russian state in relation to its population is manifested in the introduced system of "maternal (family) capital", according to which the state has been depositing 250 thousand rubles since 2007. for a woman who gave birth to a second (third) child, but they can be spent only after three years from the moment of opening an account and only in strictly defined directions. In this case, the state, for example, suspects (and partly not unreasonably) women that, having given birth to a child and received the specified amount of money, they will hand over the child to an orphanage, thereby deceiving the state. In this case, in general, a progressive and useful undertaking takes about the same ugly forms as in the case of grants.
Another analogy of the extreme distrust of the Russian state towards its population is observed in the introduction of such a rule as the need to provide, when leaving one of the spouses with a child abroad, a notarized permission of the second spouse (indicating the period and country of departure). In this case, the presumption of innocence of Russians is clearly violated, and each of the spouses of all Russian families is perceived by the state as a potential criminal intending to take his own child out of the country for subsequent sale. This practice creates enormous complications, first of all, for ordinary law-abiding citizens. Although the attempt to protect children from possible criminal actions by fraudsters should be classified as positive in itself, its forms do not fit into the framework of rational legal and economic mechanisms.
In all three cases – in the system of grants, "maternity capital" and notarial exit permits – we are faced with a lack of trust of the state to its population. This state of affairs, of course, can be partially justified by the inadequate behavior of Russians, but in any case, the state, apparently, should take the first step in showing its trust in its citizens. It is impossible to build such democratic institutions as a competitive system of research grants on the old ideological platform of extreme suspicion. In this regard, without a revision of the current position regarding the eligibility of individual researchers, a progressive restructuring of the system of taxation of grant subsidies is impossible.
There is another prejudice that underlies the current vicious system of "rolling out" grants through organizations. The fact is that thanks to the transfer mechanism in the form of legal entities, the state returns part of the money allocated to support domestic researchers. And such a result in the highest echelons of power, apparently, is considered a great achievement. However, the same result could be achieved in another, simpler way – by allocating smaller amounts of money for state scientific funds. If certain money is still allocated, then, as a rule, the real needs of the country are behind this, and it is not only not advisable to carry out indirect sequestration of the allocated amounts, but also dangerous, since this can destroy the already weak sector of domestic science. Thus, the rejection of a complex tax game in relation to research grants is an indispensable condition for building a normal system of support for science.
It can be assumed that one of the reasons for the formation of a grant system based on the participation of firms and organizations is the technical unrealizability of financing individuals from the country's budget. However, this is not the case. Nothing prevents, for example, to make tranches (payments) on grants from the Treasury of the country directly to researchers on their accounts in Sberbank, which has branches in all regions of the country. In principle, this system would not differ much from the current system of transferring funds to the accounts of legal entities opened in most cases in the same Sberbank. In this regard, the prejudice about the technical preference of financial transactions through legal entities must be eliminated.
Summarizing the above, it should be noted the need to introduce three simple principles for the formation of a grant system: maximum trust of the state to individual researchers; refusal of the authorities to save on science with the help of "hidden" fiscal instruments; active introduction of modern financial technologies for budget work with individuals. Otherwise, the constant "taking away" of half of the allocated funds (grants) can greatly demotivate domestic researchers, on whom the construction of a modern national economy of an innovative type largely depends.
Portal "Eternal youth" http://vechnayamolodost.ru01.09.2009