Demographic crisis in Russia: a look from across the ocean

American analysts predict extinction for RussiansFernando de la Cuadro, Compulenta
I

On August 12, 2010, the authoritative American demographer and political economist Nicholas Eberstadt, an expert primarily on North Korea, but also on Russia, presented the report "The Russian Demographic Crisis of Peacetime: Dimensions, Causes, Consequences" at the Washington Hudson Institute (Russia's Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications, available for free download until August 31).

(Hint: if you did not have time to download these 340 pages of text and graphs before the deadline and you really need them, contact the editorial office of the portal "Eternal Youth" :)

Mr. Eberstadt is a researcher at the Washington Institute for American Affairs (American Enterprise Institute, AEI), an influential private conservative think tank (an institution engaged in lobbying ideas); the Hudson Institute is practically a twin of AEI. The report was prepared for another think tank, The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), based on the results of three years of research by Nicholas Eberstadt and a group of NBR experts.

The work was ready back in May, but the date of its presentation creates a depressing context: Russia of August 2010 gives reasons to call itself a failed state more than ever. The relationship between systemic corruption and the lack of reaction of the system to extreme conditions is manifested as vividly as a riding fire in a coniferous forest.

II

Eberstadt looks at Russian demographic problems more broadly than many analysts, and certainly more broadly than the authors of the "Concept of Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025", which extrapolates the current surge in fertility (a larger generation has entered childbearing age) and a decrease in mortality (almost everyone who could have died) for many years to come and it provides that the population of Russia will soon begin to grow. The American researcher cites data on the account of "times" "interrupting" calculations from the "Concept": Russian citizens aged 15 to 30 years are now 60% more than children from 0 to 15.

Eberstadt, like many Russian researchers, emphasizes the atypical nature of the modern Russian demographic situation: the birth rate characteristic of a developed country, combined with life expectancy at the level of developing countries. Comparing the losses of the population of the Russian Federation since the early 1990s (7 million) with the losses of the Russian Federation itself in the Great Patriotic War (13 million) is a downright domestic (and almost polemical) technique. Eberstadt agrees with his Russian colleagues in explaining the reasons for the fall in the birth rate – linking it with the spread of high-quality contraception and a change in values (the so-called second demographic transition, which affected the number of divorces, the spread of civil marriages and the average age of marriage). Eberstadt assesses whether migration will cover the population decline (no, it will not), and analyzes in detail the causes of high mortality of Russians.

If mortality from infectious diseases is within the norm (for a country with such an income level), then Russia is ahead of everyone in terms of mortality from injuries, poisoning and cardiovascular diseases. (Here we need to make a small digression: "thyrotoxic heart" as the cause of death falls into the "cardiac" category, but in fact, the death of a person close to the author of this compilation was not so much due to the diagnostic and preventive infirmity of the domestic health care system, as to the unwillingness of employers to create conditions for the treatment of workers; Eberstadt has confirmation of this point The researcher suggests that smoking and alcoholism are the cause of high mortality from cardiovascular diseases, and alcoholism is also from poisoning and injuries (in the latter case, Russia is in a statistical environment torn by ethnic conflicts in sub–Saharan African countries).

Eberstadt examines in detail the problem of aging of Russians, asks (as a political economist) the riddle of low labor productivity with a high level of education, almost immediately giving an answer (but, surprisingly, not designating it). The American researcher is downright amazed at the rapidly growing difference in life expectancy of Russians with different levels of education (see Figure 1) in the absence of a comparable difference in income. Already at the beginning of this century, the difference in life expectancy was 10 years for women (with and without higher education, respectively) and 13 for men (the average life expectancy in Russia is 61.8 and 74.1 years for men and women, respectively). Looking ahead, let's say: Eberstadt's calculations suggest that in a society with low social synergy, education (dare we say, personality culture) is translated not into high labor productivity, but into the individual's ability to survive (any reader will find empirical evidence in everyday life). We did not quite unreasonably mention the culture of the individual, since Eberstadt himself speaks about the "differences in the lifestyle" of Russians determined by education, which affect the duration of this life.

Fig. 1. Life expectancy of Russian women (top) and men (bottom)
at the age of 20 in 1980-2001 (Y axis) depending on education
(from top to bottom, in each case – higher, secondary, nez. average).Speaking about Eberstadt's research, it is critically important to note the following: all sections of the report are well-founded by Russian sources.

All but one, entitled "Social Capital in Russia: an installation problem of national scale", in which the author no longer echoes domestic researchers. The only Russian referred to here by Eberstadt is emigrant sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh from the University of Michigan (V. Sh.'s remarks about the low level of trust in Russian society are quoted; by the way, read Dr. Shlapentokh's blog). So, "social capital" is mainly outside the field of interests of the majority of Russian demographers, economists and sociologists. At the same time, as Eberstadt convincingly shows, the causes of Russian demographic, as well as closely related economic and political problems are easiest to understand, operating with this concept.

III

The concept of "social capital" (very close, if not identical, "social synergy") has been used by numerous researchers, including Pierre Bourdieu, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Putnam, James Coleman. The latter claims that social capital "exists in the relationship between individuals" and "makes it possible to achieve goals that cannot be achieved in its absence." Coleman identifies three forms of social capital: trust in the social environment, information capacity of the social structure, norms/sanctions. Fukuyama reduces social capital to the level of trust in society, and Putnam reduces it to the participation of people in voluntary public associations. It is quite easy to draw a general basis for definitions: Eberstadt writes that the greater the social capital of a society, the further it is from the atomized state. Putnam also suggests a connection between individual happiness and the social capital of society (here we can recall Emmanuel Levinas, who argued that happiness is not an attribute of personality – it constitutes personality, through "participation not in being, but in happiness"). The concept of social capital has also been used in their works by four Nobel laureates in economics.

Relying on this powerful theoretical base, Eberstadt provides, in our opinion, the most interesting data in his research: on voluntary participation of citizens in public organizations and associations (Russia is at the bottom of the list of 70 countries); on the answer to the frontal question "Is it worth trusting people?" (Russians are rather not inclined); according to the subjective perception of the world (more than half of Russians are unhappy; in general, only Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Romanians are more unhappy (see Fig. 2); Russians are even more unhappy than those who are eight times poorer than them); according to the happy life expectancy indicator (introduced by Ruut Feinhofen from the University of Rotterdam), derived from happiness and life expectancy (Russia shows a depressingly low result, see Figure 3).

Figure 2. The ratio of GDP per capita by country (X)
and the percentage of "not particularly happy" and "very unhappy" residents, 2005 (Y).

Figure 3. The ratio of GDP per capita (X)
and the happy life expectancy indicator by country, 2006 (Y).Further, Eberstadt tries to link the poverty of the social capital of modern Russia with the causes of mortality that are "popular" in our country (social networks support patients, contribute to the diagnosis of diseases, reduce stress; we laconize: the less people are indifferent to each other, the less they get sick, and also – the happier a person is, the less reason he has to drink bitter and especially to kill drunk), puts forward a hypothesis about the connection of the low level of social capital in Russia with the distortions of the political system ("sovereign democracy" and "power vertical") and stops a step away from linking a small social capital with a low birth rate.

(Common sense, however, tells us that happy people are more likely to have a child than unhappy ones. Happy people will create more powerful, more extensive social networks than unhappy ones. And participation in extensive social networks additionally disposes to having children.)

Eberstadt is not an innovator and not a cover-breaker: he separately points out that only 50 scientific studies linking social capital with life expectancy and health level were published before 2000, and more than 620 in 2000-2009. The final part of the report emphasizes that the demographic crisis in Russia, threatening the prospects of the country's economic development and its status as a military superpower, has roots in the neglect of the Russian elite "human resources" (human resources, another term often used in the study), from which the low level of social capital stems. As Eberstadt notes, there is not a single "raw material superpower" in the world yet; the most developed countries are developing human resources and increasing social capital.

IV

Eberstadt's recipe for Russia is a radical change of mentality; the recipe (perhaps for reasons discussed below) is given in passing, because the scientist does not see any real opportunities for a "drunk nation" to get out of a long–term decline "tied" to demographic, although he repeats in the final that the world needs a strong Russia, rich in human resources (a weakening Russia will be more unpredictable and dangerous).

A change of mentality by a single volitional effort, it seems to us, is hardly possible; moreover, I, Fernando Lynch de la Cuadro, a descendant of Catalan, Basque and Irish Republicans (according to my mother), am afraid of the transformation of Russians I like into Protestants with horse faces like the respected Mr. Eberstadt (what, hack me with a machete, Mr.-n implies, condescendingly speaking about the change of mentality). Where there is a Saxon (German or English) Protestant, there is potato famine, apartheid, blacks are lynched, Jews and Gypsies are thrown into gas ovens and atomic bombs are parachuted onto the Japanese. Dixi.

Joking aside, it's a shame to me that Russian commandants not only neglect social capital, but also do not know what it is, while even a right-wing American analyst who collaborates with conservative pundit William Kristol (who played a key role in Sarah Palin's nomination for vice-presidential candidate from the US Republican Party in 2008), who published a book that the problem of poverty in the United States is overestimated (since the poor, receiving benefits and benefits, have an income higher than that used to calculate the amount of benefits and benefits), 11 years ago predicted the imminent end of North Korea... even the American conservative (only a quarter of a century ago, their idol Maggie Thatcher claimed that society does not exist) the analyst has not only learned what social capital is, but also actively operates with this concept, as well as a variety of related ones. Oh, yes, among Eberstadt's colleagues at AEI is a wonderful person in every way, Newt Leroy Gingrich (about whom the "Monty Pythons" joked: «Newts make good pets»).

V

In the US, the Eberstadt report is likely to become another projectile in the cultural war between the right and the left. It is significant that when discussing his previous material on Russian demography, Russia itself was quickly forgotten. The expert community was interested in the question of whether a demographic crisis similar to the Russian one would happen in developed countries, as well as why the birth rate in the so-called welfare states of Western Europe is lower than in libertarian America.

As for the hopes and prospects for Russia, they may be rooted, again, not in a change of mentality, but in the development of human resources and the accumulation of social capital. In Russian society, according to Eberstadt, there is a core with relatively high social synergy – people with higher education (and high life expectancy); according to the data provided by Eberstadt, the proportion of happy among them is twice (!) more than in the whole country. (It is a pity, but the researcher did not provide data on investments in children, where Russians would be segregated on an educational basis; Eberstadt confines himself to admitting that the information is contradictory: on the one hand, there are many street children in Russia, on the other – the absolute majority of Russians are child-loving and tend to provide children with the right diet, even denying themselves food.)

In the synergistic core of Russian society, the number of connections is constantly increasing due to the growing number of Internet users. The further away, the more the core will become aware of itself and self-organize, as well as expand. The relevant processes are unfolding everywhere. Examples are associations of motorists and cyclists or a popular web encyclopedia of memes lurkmore.ru . The "overwhelming amount of hatred" for "cattle" on the pages of the site is in no way discrimination on educational or territorial grounds. Only an undesirable lifestyle is ridiculed: improper nutrition, smoking during pregnancy, antisocial behavior ("bullying"). The core of the society spreads its values – "Uchi matan" (love of exact sciences), and also welcomes the ability to argue their point of view.

The question of whether the current quasi-elite will put pressure on a qualified working family-with–children Anonymous person with a higher education riding a bicycle is a key one for the future of our country.

However, there is still the question "Can it?". And will he notice?

P. S. See the bibliography on the topic "Social Capital in Russia" here.

Portal "Eternal youth" http://vechnayamolodost.ru23.08.2010